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Background
The international environment in which German and European foreign policy is made 
has become more competitive, hostile, complex and uncertain. These trends can, among 
others, be attributed to changes in the global order connected to structural changes in 
the distribution of power, the impact of new technologies, and societal changes within 
and outside of Europe.
The surprises that German political leaders experienced in the early 2010s were partly 
symptoms of these underlying changes, but also linked to shortcomings such as limited 
political receptivity to expert forecasts and warnings. Given their impact, the following 
crises merit postmortem analyses of strengths and weaknesses in how Germany 
anticipated and handled them: ISIS’ rise to power in Iraq and Syria and an escalation 
of tensions between Russia and Ukraine, both in 2013-2014. The findings are based 
on the INTEL project, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) which investigated how the EU, Germany, and the UK foresaw and responded 
to various crises and which lessons analysts, policy-planners and decision-makers ought 
to learn. 
Key questions asked from a lesson-learning perspective
1. What was the degree, level and spread of surprise in these two cases?
2. To what extent is the surprise “condonable” given mitigating factors?
3. What were the main underlying reasons for analysts or decision-makers to be surprised?





The analysis is based on tracing knowledge claims made over time in hundreds of expert 
open sources and on around 30 interviews with intelligence analysts, external experts 
and policymakers. In addition, this briefing takes feedback from a workshop in April 
2021 with German officials under Chatham House rules into account. The assessments 
presented below are those of the authors’ alone.
ISIS’ Rise to Power, 2013-2014
What was surprising?
•  Partial suprise: The fall of Mosul to ISIS in June 2014,especially the withdrawal 
of the Iraqi Army, the ease with which ISIS captured Mosul, and ISIS’ rapid 
expansion beyond Mosul. 
•  Significant surprise: Confronted with media coverage of the Sinjar massacre in 
August 2014, appeals by the Yazidi and Kurdish diasporas as well as a cross-party 
consensus in the German Bundestag for the protection of Yazidis and support of 
Kurdistan, German decision-makers experienced surprise that ISIS’ expansion 
affected German interests and that Iraq became a foreign policy priority over the 
summer of 2014.
•  Partial surprise: the timing of ISIS’ surge into Fallujah and Ramadi, that Fallujah was 
also targeted, how promptly ISIS exploited Sunni unrest, that Syrian rebels failed to 
oust ISIS from Raqqa after ISIS had suffered losses there and elsewhere in Syria. 
Key diagnostic difficulties
•  Lack of access (especially Syria, but also some Iraqi towns), including next to no 
ability to draw on local contacts. 
•  Challenge of finding reliable local reports (e.g. during ISIS’ Anbar campaign). 
•  Complexity and speed of parallel developments across Syria and Iraq requiring 
integrated cross-unit analysis of the interplay of economic, ethnic, ideological, 
political and military factors.
•  High degree of discontinuity and novelty with ISIS breaking away from al-Qaeda 
and preparing for a transnational caliphate, among others through tax and revenue-
raising strategies and quick build-up of administrative structures. 
•  Limited understanding of the actual weakness of the Iraqi security forces. 
•  Novelty and complexity of radicalisation processes and of online recruitment and 
inspiration strategies.
•  Difficulty of anticipating secondary consequences of relevance to German audiences 
and interests.
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Underlying reasons for performance problems
•  Lack of enough and sufficiently qualified (eg Arabic-speaking) staff working on and in 
the region, especially during early phase of crisis. 
•  Cultural biases leading to underestimation of structural vulnerabilities in Iraq and 
Syria. 
•  Limited political receptivity to early warnings given lack of interest in Iraq until fall of 
Mosul for reasons going back to 2003. 
•  Limited attention to the “war within the war” in Syria; 
•  Intelligence analysts struggling to challenge conventional wisdom among their superiors 
and explain how German interests would be affected. 
•  Substantial reliance on US/UK intelligence assessments with a positive slant on Iraq 
and the Iraqi army. 
•  Distractions by debate about the use of chemical weapons in Syria. 
•  Apparent belief in a political solution to the Syrian civil war. 
•  The German federal elections in September 2013 leading to a gap in leadership at a 
critical time. 
•  The Ukraine conflict creating agenda competition. 
The case of Ukraine, 2013-2014
What was surprising?
• Partial surprise: Yanukovych’s U-Turn on EU Association Agreement before the 
Vilnius summit as well as the dynamism, support and impact of the Euromaidan 
protest.
•  Significant surprise: Yanukovych’s narrow domestic support and subsequent flight in 
February 2014 despite a diplomatic deal. 
•  Near perfect surprise: Russian military action and outright annexation of Crimea 
even though Crimea had been known to be of strategic importance and ENP/AA 
had been recognised as a geopolitical threat to Russia. 
•  Partial surprise: Russian destabilisation and military intervention in Donbas from 
spring 2014 onwards.
Key diagnostic difficulties
•  Understanding Ukrainian two-ways facing negotiation tactics vis-à-vis EU and 
Russia. 
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•  Understanding the extent of local public unhappiness with Yanukovych regime, the 
crucial role of oligarchs switching sides and the narrow power basis of the regime.
•  Difficulty of penetrating Putin’s inner circle of advisors, associates and proxies to 
gauge intentions, resolve, and preparations due to secrecy and senior Russian 
diplomats being kept out of the loop. 
•  Lack of sufficient information on take-over plans and military preparations. 
•  Reliance on sources from other member states whose track-record and interests may 
make them appear biased (cry-wolf); 
•  Susceptibility to Russian propaganda/lies on Crimea operation; overestimated readiness 
of Ukrainian armed forces to resist take-over in Crimea. 
Underlying reasons for performance problems
•  Lack of systematic contingency/scenario planning and surprise-sensitive forecasting in 
advance or after the Vilnius summit; 
•  Problematic division of labour in EU external action with EU member states paying 
insufficient attention to the geopolitical aspects of ENP/enlargement led by the EU 
Commission; 
•  Lack of HUMINT/SIGINT on Russian military plans at both EU and member state level; 
•  Forgotten lessons from USSR era about manoeuvres and deception; 
•  Not enough country expertise on Ukraine; 
•  In-built tendency to discount rather than discuss warnings from frontline Northern 
and Eastern European states (e.g. Poland/Sweden) because of high and asymmetric 
politicisation of Russia dossier.
Lessons learning in Germany since 2014
Germany has recently attempted to learn some lessons through a) the 2014 
Foreign Office Review b) the 2016 Ministry of Defence Whitebook c) the 2017 
Government/Foreign Office Guidelines on Civilian Conflict Prevention and a 
March 2021 Implementation Report. These led to substantial budget increases for 
conflict prevention, stabilisation, defence and intelligence. These changes enabled 
the recruitment of more experts and beefed-up coordination, advisory and research 
structures in crisis prevention/stability (eg unit S within the foreign ministry, cross-
governmental working groups on early anticipation and prevention of crises; funding 
for conflict research, external advisory board for civilian crisis prevention). Evaluation 
practice and strategic foresight appears to have improved (Guideline Implementation 
2021). 
INTEL endorses these changes and the lessons underpinning them, provides 
additional nuance, and highlights problems and lessons that have been missed. 
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However, some lessons from previous cases such as Afghanistan have either not been 
correctly identified or not learned. Others have been missed or learned only by certain 
ministries, but not across government, parliament and public. 
Good intelligence requires ready access to a healthy mix of more junior and senior  
country and regional specialists with access to local open sources and complementary 
networks of informants. Moreover, a mix of disciplinary backgrounds, such as history, 
defence/security, area studies/anthropology and economics, is needed, which could 
be generated by stronger collaboration across ministries/resorts in country or regional 
taskforces. Such expertise should be cultivated, incentivised and preserved, for 
instance, through a dedicated career-track for diplomats and high-quality handovers 
when staff leave positions. 
The risk of “going native” and losing sensitivity to change should be balanced 
through input by experts from other European nations, quantitative/indicator-based 
approaches and other kinds of intelligence such as SIGINT/GEOINT, etc. For 
less prominent countries and given budget limitations, pooling resources with the 
EEAS and other partners could create a critical mass of country expertise relating 
to Europe’s Eastern and Southern neighbourhood. For the case of Russia, pooling of 
expertise is crucial and should go beyond disinformation and cyber. 
In early crisis situations or ahead of major decisions, Germany needs to surge regional 
expertise from inside and outside of government to provide holistic assessments 
and test competing explanations of actors’ intentions and resolve, potentially using 
scenario work and war-gaming exercises. For each country, leading external experts 
should be identified and ideally obtain security clearance before a crisis escalates. 
Universities should be incentivised, for instance, through extra-funding for teaching 
replacements to free-up time for experts who volunteer in crisis situations.
Germany needs to further improve technical capabilities for monitoring and analysing 
the content and effects of social media as well as other open sources (eg Preview tool), 
if necessary in collaboration with external partners
OSINT needs to pay special attention to reliable, specific, and nuanced information 
from local sources given the prevalence of disinformation. This would involve 
investment for the collection and analysis of open sources in embassies and missions as 
well as selective cooperation with NGOs. 
All analysts and team-leaders need to be given training in recognising and 
compensating for key cognitive, motivational and professional-cultural biases that 
are known to affect accuracy and timeliness. Examples are undue focus on state 
institutions and official actors despite the real power lying elsewhere. Another bias 
concerns mirror imaging rooted in rationality assumptions and real risk calculus of 
foreign actors for whom not just loss of power but survival may be at stake and their 
readiness to use extreme measures.  Further examples are blind-spots relating to the 
analysis of conflict actors and dynamics cross state borders, failures to appreciate 
the local effects of  violence and terror, or the subtle influence of  existing policy 
consensus or government agendas. 
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Consumers of intelligence should be given training in how their leadership may 
encourage or discourage analytical dissent and surprise-sensitive forecasting. This 
could be normalised through the standard consideration of “wildcards” and by 
creating dissent channels for junior officials whose analytical conclusions challenge 
policy consensus and conventional wisdom. 
Strategic lessons
Intelligence production needs better strategic direction of where to look and what is 
most relevant to German foreign policy interests. A comprehensive security strategy 
could help but only if it considers that German engagement is often the result of requests 
by partner countries and international organisations, media coverage of mass atrocities 
and diasporic advocacy, rather than conventional strategic and economic interests. 
Appointing a Director of Intelligence and a National Security Council could help 
improve mutual understanding between knowledge producers and users about which 
threats and opportunities to prioritise. This could also play a crucial role in overcoming 
cacophony in knowledge production arising from the “resort-principle” in German law. 
Germany needs to design and use better mechanisms for systematic and transparent 
lesson learning after experiencing surprise in foreign policy crises given the lack of 
rigorous, independent and public facing inquiries into past surprises in foreign affairs. 
Existing instruments such as parliamentary inquiries, Enquete and Expert Commissions 
are either too party-political and accountability focused to be useful or have hardy 
been used in foreign policy matters. Much could be learned from reviews organised 
by the UK House of Lords, parliamentary committees, or indeed statutory inquiries 
under the inquiry act, let alone Royal Commissions. We recommend a mixture of 
parliamentary led inquiries on specific cases (such as Afghanistan, Ukraine), coupled 
with a cross-cutting inquiry focused on German intelligence and foreign policy through 
an Independent Expert Commission with the right to access documents and to call 
witnesses. Most hearings should be public. 
The EU, and particularly the European Commission and the EEAS, need Germany as 
a more critical friend that helps to drive reform, highlights problem areas, and supports 
a beefed-up EU assessment and intelligence function, particularly in the context of 
the current Conference on the Future of Europe. Germany should support amending 
the security exclusion article in the Treaties and creating a mandate for intelligence 
collection in key areas. It should also support consensus reporting from EU delegations 
and efforts to enhance and formalise intelligence sharing with the EEAS.
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